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Diagnosis:

The Human Cost of the Rage to Order
FRED NEWMAN AND KENNETH GERGEN
Debates on the issue of psychological diagnosis have been rag
ing for decades. In recent times, both sides in the debate have become
more stubborn and self-righteous. The critics, especially, appear to be
ineffectual and impotent. Poking fun at the more ludicrous of the hun
dreds of categories of mental disorder catalogued in the DSM-IV (the
fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual that mental
health professionals and their clients have to dance to) has become a
favorite pastime not only at cocktail parties but professional confer
ences as well. But, still, diagnoses are made, infirm identities are solid
ified and treatment is prescribed.
In Realities and Relationships, Gergen describes the cultural
dynamic of diagnosis as "the cycle of progressive infirmity":
Mental health professionals exist in a symbiotic relation
ship with the culture, drawing sustenance from cultural
beliefs, altering these beliefs in systematic ways, dissemi
nating these views back to the culture, and relying on their
incorporation into the culture for continual sustenance. Yet
the effects of this symbiosis seem increasingly substantial.
In pa.rticular, a cyclical process seems to be operating that,
once activated, expands the domain of deficit to an ever
increasing infirmity; hierarchies of discrimination, denatu
ralized patterns of interdependence, and an expanding
arena of self-deprecation. The historical process may be
viewed as one of "progressive infirmity." (Gergen, 1994, p.
155)
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Independent of each other, Gergen and Newman had been pursuing
the philosophical assumptions that underlie diagnosis and that perpet
uate this cycle, both of them in theoretical writings and Newman in the
practice of social therapy. In this essay, originally delivered at the
103rd Convention of the American Psychological Association in New
York in August, 1995, the two join forces and, with the aid of
Wittgenstein, flex their philosophical and psychological muscles to pre
sent a methodologically sophisticated and radically humanistic call for
an end to Truth and for the democratization ofdiagnosis. -L.H.
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Let us distinguish and contrast "two views on the vocabulary of
mind," the pictorial and the pragmatic (Gergen, 1994). The pictorial
view which, we believe, remains dominant in practice in our culture
(for mental language in particular and language in general) identifies
mental vocabulary as fundamentally referential, i.e., its primary func
tion is to accurately (truthfully) describe states of mind (in ordinary
emotive, attitudinal and cognitive terms, in physiological terms, in phe
nomenological terms, in intra-psychic terms, in behavioral terms, if
you happen to believe that the discrete and discernible events of mental
life are the behaviors associated with it, and so on). These descriptions
correspond, on the pictorial view, to objective states of inner and,
sometimes, outer "reality," and the utterances of these descriptions (in
therapy) are typically either first person efforts to express and/or com
municate a mental state or second and third person efforts to attribute
one to the first person, a.k.a. the patient, client, group member, etc.
In accordance with this view the clinical client is typically urged
(by the therapist) to say "what's going on," i.e., is urged to describe in
as much detail, honesty and depth as she or he can the "inner realities"
to which she or he has a special, though presumably by no means omni
scient, observational relationship. The therapist is, characteristically,
skilled in supporting the client to do so and, moreover, is equipped to
offer alternative descriptions of the client's state of mind which nurtur
ingly or at least neutrally challenge the truth, the meaning, the coheren
cy, the clarity, the value, etc. of the client's first-person descriptions.
Diagnosing is, so it seems to us, but one element of this describing and
redescribing (defining) process. While the diagnosis per se may or may
not be literally conveyed to the client directly (in more liberal therapeu
tic settings it typically is, although in the most liberal-radical environ
ments it may be "officially" renounced), it at least informs the
therapist's nondiagnostic redescriptions. Indeed, as we and others
(Guattari, Deleuze, etc.) have pointed out, such redescription in med
ical or pseudomedical pictorial-based language often receives a very
positive response from the client since it may normalize her or his sub
jective state of mind. In effect,
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...the vocabulary of the mental health professions does
serve to render the alien familiar, and thus less fearsome.
Rather than being seen as "the work of the devil" or as "fright
eningly strange," for example, nonnormative activities are
given standardized labels, signifying that they are indeed nat
ural, fully anticipated, and long familiar to the sciences.
(Gergen, 1994, p.148)

A BRIEF HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THIS VIEW
The above characterization of talk-therapy (to some extent even
mental talk in ordinary life) is, obviously, simplistic by virtue of being
so narrow in its focus. Yet, in our opinion, it is not inaccurate as far as
it goes.
The pictorial view of mental vocabulary and/or the validity of some
or all diagnostics or mental descriptions has been severely critiqued
directly and indirectly in psychological circles in recent years by Szasz
and others following or influenced by him. Yet, in our opinion, the picto
rial view typifies everyday clinical practice, as a brief history of the
exponential growth of both the number of psychological helping profes
sionals and the number of diagnostic descriptions of the clients, present
ed, for example, in DSM-IV, makes plain (Gergen, 1994). Simply put,
there are more therapists (lay and credentialled) using many more scien
tific or pseudoscientific medicalized or quasi-medicalized pictorially
based descriptions of many more clients than at any previous time in his
tory. Psychological diagnostic description has permeated the broader cul
ture and, we argue, with pernicious consequences.
The pictorial view of mental language has as well been seriously
considered and critiqued this past half century by philosophically
trained "philosophical psychologists." (Some of the earliest ones
include Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind; G.E.M. Anscombe,
Intention; Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action; H.L.A. Hart and
A.M. Honore, Causation in the Law; William A. Dray, Laws and
Explanation in History, and most of the books in the series edited by R.
F. Holland, Studies in Philosophical Psychology, including Anthony
Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, and A.I. Melden, Free Action.) A
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good deal of this criticism is properly and understandably associated
with the writings and thought of the Austrian-born, Cambridge-trained
philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, most particularly with his later writ
ings, for example, his Philosophical Investigations. In a more recent
and, in our opinion, quite positive development, trained psychologists
(and others with expertise in related practical fields) have come to
study Wittgenstein more directly to explore nonpictorial approaches to
psychological concerns and paradoxes (see Morss, 1992, 1993;
Shotter, 1990, 1993a and b; Stenner, 1993).
As Van der Merwe and Voestermans put it in the abstract to their
recent (and exceedingly valuable) article, "Wittgenstein's Legacy and
the Challenge to Psychology," in Theory & Psychology: "The present
resurgence of interest in Ludwig Wittgenstein is related to the growing
concern in the philosophy and methodology of the behavioural sciences
with the role played by conceptual frameworks, models and metaphors
in the mediation of our experience of the world" (1995, p.27).
Wittgenstein's influence on the varied areas of psychology and
social work grows by leaps and bounds. As such, it becomes increas
ingly important to ask how and, indeed, whether he is being understood.
Van der Merwe and Voestermans think he is not being understood very
well at all. They say: "Wittgenstein's message to psychologists is to
move about around things and events in the world, [our italics] instead
of trying to delineate essential features" (1995, p.38). And they imme
diately add in a section aptly called "Dilution of the Analysis of Forms
of Life":
Have psychologists gotten that message clearly? We are
convinced they have not. One of the reasons for this is that
Wittgenstein has been ambiguous himselfabout what it means
to move about and around things and events. Wittgenstein
himself provided an opportunity for escape from what he
deemed as the prime task not just of philosophy but of all
efforts at understanding, including psychological understand
ing. He has outlined two main routes. On the one hand, he
introduces the notion of language-game. This notion 'brings
into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part
ofan activity or a form oflife' (PI: §23). On the other hand, he
remained preoccupied, one could say, with purifying strate
gies, that is, with attempts to employ philosophical analysis
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for clarification of concepts. Along this latter strategic line the
language-game approach has become an end in itself without
much reference to or participation in the activity or the form
of life of which language-use is a part. This second route has
given ample opportunity for evasive moves like a defense of
relativism or an overemphasis on the yoking relationship
between concepts and the larger language-game frame.
Psychologists in general have favoured this second route at the
expense of really taking up the challenge of what it means 'to
move around about things', that is to say, to come to grips with
the role forms of life actually play. (1995, p. 39)

In an important sense this means going beyond the pragmatic view
of language with which Wittgenstein is frequently associated. In Lev
Vygotsky: Revolutionary Scientist, Newman and Holzman (1993a) pro
pose that words surely are used within society in the manner of tools.
(Following Vygotsky, we would call them "tools-for-results" in contrast
to "tools-and-results.") And, no doubt, Wittgenstein is susceptible to
being classified (if classification is your game) a pragmatist or instru
mentalist in light of such remarks as "Look at the word or the sentence
as an instrument and its meaning as its employment" (Pl: §421). And
perhaps even more for his oft-quoted remark, "For a large class of
cases-though not for all-in which we employ the word 'meaning' it
can be defined thus: The meaning of a word is its use in the language"
(PI: §43).
Moreover, he is so classified by many philosophers in secondary
sources. Yet, such classification can (and does) easily obscure
Wittgenstein's "form-of-lifeism," not to mention his form of life. For
while he uses the notion and language of "language-games" in several
different ways, central to his understanding, we believe, are such
provocative formulations as:" ...the term 'language-game' is meant to
bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of
an activity, or of a form of life" (Pl: § 23) and "Only in the stream of
thought and life do words have meaning" (Z:§ 173).
The common overidentification of words and language games
derives, we believe, from a deeper and commonplace confusion as to
what language-games are. Not surprisingly, given Wittgenstein's anti
essentialism and anti-definitionalism there is no precise definition, in
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Wittgenstein's writings, of what a language-game is. Different lan
guage games, like everything else, have only "family resemblances."
But many psychologists (interested most particularly in issues of ana
lytical metapsychology) have taken the meaning-use equation as a
pragmatic frame of reference for understanding language-games as a
philosophical/psychological technique for the analysis of mental
vocabulary. This is surely one way in which Wittgenstein himself uses
the term "language-game."
Merwe and Voestermans put it this way:
It is almost a fad in psychological circles nowadays to accept
Wittgenstein's criticism of psychology's conceptual confusion.
'Psychologists are prone to unclarity about everyday psycho
logical concepts and the sophisticated experimental methods
they employ fail to deal satisfactorily with the problems
addressed,' Budd (1991, p.xii) wrote in his study of
Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology. (1995, p. 38)

But for Wittgenstein, we believe (following especially Baker,
1992), the meaning-use equation is not to be identified with under
standing. For an equation (an identification) or, indeed, any analysis,
does not perform the activity moving " . . . about around things and
events" associated with the form of life and theory of meaning. An
understanding of language games as a mere pragmatic tool of analysis
is, we believe, no understanding at all. Understanding is not "delineat
ing essential features" of either facts in the world (as in Wittgenstein's
earlier Tractatus) or uses of concepts and language in society. It is a
social activity; a performance, a moving " ...about around things and
events in the world." To understand and change meaning we must be
historically active, that is, revolutionarily active, practically-critically
active. We must change "the aspect" (the totality of things) by activi
ty-moving about around things, changing our location-not via
philosophical or psychological analysis. As Merwe and Voestermans
put it: "Language and naming do not come out of the blue.Both origi
nate in the forms of life to which practice, precisely in its bodily and
emotionally structured form, belongs" (1995, p.42). They then quote
Wittgenstein from Culture and Value thus:
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A philosopher says "Look at things like this"-but in the
first place that doesn't ensure that people will look at things
like that, and in the second place his admonition may come
altogether too late; it is possible, moreover, that such an admo
nition can achieve nothing in any case and that the impetus for
such a change in the way things are perceived has to originate
somewhere else entirely.(1980, p.61e)

And they comment on this typically practical-minded Wittgensteinian
observation: "That is as much to say that change of aspect requires a
change of life" (1995, p.43).
Indeed the issues of Wittgenstein's form of life and form of thought
themselves (not just what he had to say about them) are, in our opinion,
critical to the creation of a new psychology in general and a new clini
cal psychology in particular. For while a pragmatic understanding of
the vocabulary of mental language in juxtaposition (and contradistinc
tion) to a pictorial understanding of mental language is of substantial
critical deconstructionist and social constructionist metapsychological
. value, it is "form of lifeism," we would suggest, which proves most
vital in creating a new social psychology (Jost, 1995), a new develop
mental phenomenology (Van der Merwe and Voestermans, 1995) and a
new domain of clinical practice (Gergen and Kaye, 1993; Newman and
Holzman, 1993a and b).
WITTGENSTEIN'S FORM OF LIFE AND THOUGHT

Baker, one of the philosophical world's leading interpreters of
Wittgenstein, looks at his form of (philosophical) thought and life as
follows:
I suggest scrupulous attention to Wittgenstein's overall
therapeutic conception of his philosophical investigations ...
far from undertaking to give any general outline of the logical
geography of our language ...he always sought to address
specific philosophical problems of definite individuals and to
bring to light conceptual confusion which these individuals
would acknowledge as a form of entanglement in their own
rules ...he operated as a general practitioner who treated the
bumps that various individual patients had got by running
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their heads up against the limits oflanguage ... Wittgenstein's
practice in philosophising is not less, but rather more, consis
tently therapeutic than we commonly recognize. (Baker, 1992,
p. 129)

In the development ofthe social therapeutic group practice over the
past two decades one ofus (Newman) has sought to use the therapeutic
Wittgenstein's practical-critical (unsystematic) "form of life," activity
theoretic understanding. In what does this consist? It must first be said
that for practical purposes both the pictorial and the pragmatic "meta
views on the vocabulary of mind" must be abandoned. For while the
pragmatic view is surely both closer to life and closer to Wittgenstein, it
is plainly not close enough. Why? Because both the pictorial and the
pragmatic views are, at root, identity-theoretic; one, the pictorial, rela
tive to "reality" so-called, the other, the pragmatic, relative to specific
societal uses. The quite particular piece ofspace-time reality (the fact)
named in the pictorial description and the equally particular societal
use (the instrumental tool) named in the pragmatic description
obscures the prominence of relational activity, that is, ". . . that the
speaking oflanguage is part ofan activity, or ofa form oflife."
Both a pictorial and a pragmatic theory ofmental meaning give way
to relational activity as the basis for social therapeutic approaches.
Only in the activity of life in relations do words have meaning. And to
alter the form oflife is to alter the meaning ofwords and discourse.
The nagging practical/theoretic concern that this activity-theoretic
approach somehow leaves out the "something" in "the mind" (or, in
phenomenological terms, "the body") that cries out for expression or
inclusion is well engaged by Vygotsky's radical activity-theoretic and
dialectical view on thinking and speaking. He says:
Thought is not expressed but completed in the word ....
The structure of speech is not simply the mirror image of the
structure ofthought. It cannot, therefore, be placed on thought
like clothes off a rack. Speech does not merely serve as the
expression of developed thought.Thought is restructured as it
is transformed into speech. It is not expressed but completed
in the word.(Vygotsky, 1987, pp. 250-251)
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So it is, we would argue, with all "mental states" or acts, not just
thought or thinking. For Vygotsky's view is, it seems to us, a brilliant
and useful critique ofthe concept of"expression," the companion piece
to every and any dualistic, identity-based theory of mind, mental
vocabulary and/or mental acts. The move to relational activity requires
a full blown re-ontologizing away from the stuff of the mind and the
stuff outside of the mind (a Cartesian mind/body-nature dualism) to a
self/other unity. Only such an activity-theoretic ontology, it seems to us,
can further mix with other elements of life and history to produce the
forms oflife which make meaning itselfpossible, on the one hand, and
the transformation oflife and its form, via the transformation ofmean
ing, possible, on the other. This Vygotskian-Wittgensteinian activity
theoretic view of mental language and meaning is plainly a relational
theoretic, as opposed to an identity-theoretic Cartesian, viewpoint.
We may now be more able to approach the complex and disturbing
issue of diagnostics in clinical work from a fresh (and less dualistic)
point of view. Moreover, a more concrete discussion (of how social
therapy does-performs-diagnosing) can, we hope, inform our "abstract"
theoretical formulations.
ALL THAT 5ZASZ

For all that he has contributed to our thinking about such matters in
the last quarter ofa century, perhaps Szasz has done us a disservice. Not
unlike the pragmatization of Wittgenstein (and, we would argue, the
instrumentalization ofVygotsky by many American psychologists in the
tradition ofDewey and Mead), Szasz has focused our attention so much
on the myth ofmental illness that he has diverted our critical eye some
what from the myth ofpsychology. Perhaps our selves have become suf
ficiently saturated to point out that mental illness is painfully real but
that psychology, ill-shapen by its identity-theoretic, antirelational, pseu
doscientific pseudoparadigm, has become a haven for (and a proselytiz
er of) forms of life which are recognizably nondevelopmental. One such
traditional therapeutic form oflife is diagnosing.
Following Szasz, maybe we ofa more critical persuasion have been
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much too easily taken in by endless trivial (though humorous) critiques
of diagnostic descriptions (a form of psychological liberalism) without
sufficiently looking at the diagnostic form(s) of life.
SOCIAL THERAPY: CHANGING THE FORM OF RELATIONAL LIFE
"One does not cure neurosis, one changes a society which
cannot do without it." (Lotringer, 1977)

The social therapeutic process is a collective moving about around
things and events in the world. It is, more particularly, a moving about
around emotional things and events in the world. Considering
Wittgenstein's "retreat from essentialism," Van der Merwe and
Voestermans state:
What is 'a table,' a 'chair,' 'a game,' or an utterance like
'five red apples'? In order to solve that problem one should
act, so to speak, and do things like using a table or a chair, or
looking for commonalities in games and go to a store and buy
apples. By doing things such as these the fog will disappear.
(1995, p. 38)

In social therapy, we seek to collectively move about around
"depression," "anxiety," "three painful days," "I' m angry at you," etc.
How do we move about around them? Surely not by analytically seeking
to discover their essences. Definitely not by determining the truth value
of judgments in which they are contained. And not even by cognitively
uncovering the complex societal uses of such language. We do so by
changing the form of relational life. In a word, we collectively and cre
atively perform (not act) our lives without the identity-based presuppo
sitions of the existing form(s) of (our) society. And only as we create
new forms of relational life, we would say, can we understand the exist
ing forms of action. Only as we perform our lives together can we under
stand our lives as performance. Thus, the first and second and third
person descriptions uttered by clients and therapists in individual and
group therapy alike are not treated as referential, that is, as judgments
either true or false, but as lines in a play (or, perhaps better still, a poem)
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that we are at once collectively creating and performing. The social ther
apist, as performer/director, helps to keep the activity performatory, that
is, helps the group members to remember that they are in a play and not
in "real life" where their descriptions and/or judgments are true or false.
"Hey everybody," she or he might well say, "This is a play you're all
improvising. It's the performance ofyour emotional lifetime. It's creat
ing a new form of emotional life, new emotions, changing your life.
Perform, per chance to grow, to develop. Keep moving about around
emotional things and events. Keep moving. Change the form of your
and our emotional life."
It is not easy to create such an environment. Even though, as
Vygotsky teaches us, imitation and group performance (conjoint activi
ty) are critical to growth, development and cultural adaptation in our
earliest years (for example, in how we acquire language), by early ado
lescence for most ofus our performatory skills, our capacity to be who
we aren't, to be "a head taller" than we are, to do what we don't know
how to do, are more and more related to pejoratively. Performing
becomes either "acting out" or, for a few, expressing a special gift or tal
ent to act. Thus, in social therapy, our ordinary childhood ability to per
form must be reawakened and nurtured.
In such a radically performatory context the group members and
especially the therapist are not, ofcourse, knowers. Not merely because
they do not know some or even most answers, but because there are no
answers to be known. Yet the collective performance can grow, develop,
deepen, etc. Will that be known? No. Nonetheless, it can both happen
and be worked for as with any poem or performance, collective or other
wise. The group plays (in Vygotsky's sense) language games in all their
infinite variety. It performs its own relational life. Indeed, it performs
therapy and thereby creates psychology anew and continuously. In such
an environment descriptions (or seeming descriptions, ifyou prefer) are
like lines in a play or a poem in that they are, in a most important sense,
not about anything at all. Poetic meaning, in many cases, self-conscious
ly derives from the poem itselfand not from what it is about. Ifin a play
(perhaps a Sunday matinee) the performer utters the words "It is a drea
ry and dark day," it is unlikely that either other players or audience mem-
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hers will take issue on the grounds that it is 75 degrees and the sky is a
perfectly cloudless blue outside.
In such a moving around about emotional things and events--chang
ing the form of relational life, performatory environment-diagnoses
themselves can be harmless and sometimes valuable. Despite all our sar
castic observation about the more absurdist characterizations in DSM
IV, it ain't funny. Why? Because in everyday pictorial, identity-theoretic
therapy these descriptions (diagnoses) are usable as labels ofstigmatiza
tion or at least social constraint. And we do not change that by any kind
ofanalysis. We change that only by changing the diagnostic form oflife.
By opening up diagnosing to everyone, continuously though nonrefer
entially and nonjudgmentally. We all perform diagnosing together. Not
to get it right. Not to have everyone get a chance. But to conjointly cre
ate/perform a zone of relational development (to vary slightly
Vygotsky's zone of proximal development) in which we can together
create new forms oflife, new meanings, new lives. For the task ofsocial
therapy, following Wittgenstein, is to make the fog disappear, the mental
mist vanish, to create an environment which doesn't require neurosis.
In the end, why must we accept the process ofdefinition as a primary
feature of therapy or consultation? Why must we join what is in place?
The problem is not diagnosis but 'joining what's in place," that is, the
diagnostic form of life, the definitional form of description, the identifi
cational form of discourse, the analytical form of therapy and emotive
dialogue. If"diagnosing" is a problem (and indeed it is) let everyone do it
in a radically democratic, performatory environment and it will no longer
be a problem. For it is not the diagnosis but the authoritarian, patriarchal
and private "truth" ofit that does harm. People performing their emotion
al lives together includes the patient at least as much as an authoritarian
pseudomedical, pseudoscientific diagnostic description.

•

•

•

Please do not construe these remarks as a description of social ther
apy or an analysis of Wittgensteinian language games. They are-at
least we hope they are-a small effort to change the form oflife that is
delivering papers at a professional conference.
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